Friday, 17 May 2013

PAKISTAN: Sharif's Foreign and Security Policy

Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) won 124 of a total 272 seats, with its nearest rival, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), winning 31, in the country's first democratic handing over of power since independence in 1947.  With this result, Pakistan Prime Minister-elect Nawaz Sharif won't need to form a coalition with other major parties to push through badly needed reforms. To achieve the required majority of 137, he needs only secure support from a handful of like-minded independents.

The PML-N’s large victory will not necessarily guarantee good governance, but it does ensure governmental stability at Pakistan’s political center. The PML-N may have gained control over the political sphere, but its relationship with the military is ambivalent. Currently stable civil-military relations may just be the product of a potentially fleeting convergence of interests.

In terms of foreign policy, the agenda of U.S.-Pakistan relationship in the near future will be dictated by the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, and most positions have already been established. Like every other party, the PML-N surfed a wave of anti-Americanism during the campaign, but it fundamentally favors good working relations with the United States.

The PML-N was associated with the internal Pakistani discussion on the reopening of NATO’s overland supply routes to Afghanistan after a friendly fire incident killed 24 Pakistani soldiers in 2011 and is unlikely to revisit that dossier. Moreover, Nawaz Sharif has declared his willingness to establish good relations with the United States. This suggests that the new government is unlikely to seriously reevaluate its relationship with Washington, though its relations with extremist groups may continue to be an irritant in the relationship.

Pakistan’s civilian governments have typically faced significant challenges when it comes to the security establishment, which has a great deal of control over Pakistan’s foreign and defense policies. But Sharif’s relations with the military should be relatively serene.

With the PML-N’s broad civilian mandate, Pakistan’s security establishment will find it more difficult to activate its political proxies, pressure the government, and exert undue influence on policy. And though Sharif’s history with the military is spotty—during his last stint as prime minister, he sacked two influential chiefs of army staff—the two forces’ interests are converging. The PML-N’s views on security and foreign policy dovetail with those of the military, making open disagreement less likely, at least in the short term.

As the PML-N moves to exercise more control in the realm of security and foreign policy, it could find common ground with the military in an effort to curb and eventually eradicate Pakistan’s domestic political violence, which has been a chief concern of Pakistani voters and the military establishment alike. Sharif has proposed a dialogue with the Taliban and certain extremist groups in southern Punjab. In a different time, this could have proven a viable strategy—other countries have enjoyed some success in reducing violence by incorporating radicals into the political mainstream.

Historically speaking, however, such a strategy works best when the target organizations are already in decline. This is hardly the case in today’s Pakistan, where extremist and sectarian violence is on the rise all over the country.

Pakistan’s previous government had initiated a timid process of rapprochement with India, a policy that would have been impossible without at least the tacit approval of the military. Talking to senior Indian journalist Karan Thapar during the campaign, Sharif indicated his willingness to resolve all pending issues, including the Kashmir dispute, peacefully. He also signaled that he would deny anti-India extremist groups safe haven in Pakistan, forbid all anti-India speeches including by Lashkar-e-Taiba spokesman Hafez Saeed, and launch investigations into the 1999 Kargil War and the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. In these endeavors, he will most likely enjoy strong support from at least part of the PML-N’s traditional allies in the business community. But it remains to be seen just how much rapprochement the generals will allow.

For now at least, the military is dependent on Sharif: it needs him to get the country out of a dangerous situation of economic decline and diplomatic isolation. But paradoxically, if Sharif were to succeed in a wholesale renovation of Pakistan’s economy and standing in the world, he could push the army out of politics altogether, an outcome that could be unacceptable to Rawalpindi.

In the end, the relationship between the new prime minister and the military will be highly ambivalent. Establishing civilian dominance over the military will be at best an incremental process. The foreign policy of the new government is likely to be just a reflection of that reality.

By Guylain Gustave Moke
Political Analyst/Writer
World Affairs Analyst
Investigative Journalist

Photo Credit: AFP