Friday, 28 April 2017


The ANC will hold a conference in December to pick a new party leader who will be its candidate for the 2019 elections. But there is a growing fear among party members that the party could lose power in the next election, if internal divisions, corruption continue to shape the party's future. In fact, the party slipped to 55 percent of the vote in last year's local elections, its worst ever result.

Zuma, 75, is due to step down as head of the ANC in December, as as president ahead of 2019 general election. Zuma's corruption allegations, of being in the sway of the wealthy Gupta business family, allegedly granting them influence over government appointments and contracts and internal divisions within his government have weakened the party.

Dissatisfaction with the government has been growing over high levels of unemployment, a lack of basic services and allegations of widespread corruption. the ANC is likely to use its impressive mandate to try to drive through its National Development Plan - rejecting nationalisation, and emphasising investment and infrastructure. The business-friendly plan has alarmed South Africa's powerful unions - some of which may soon break away to form their own party.

It might be tempting to conclude that in South Africa the more things change, the more they stay the same. But the national polls, and electoral outcomes in South Africa’s nine provinces, reveal subtler shifts and trends that cast the election in a rather different light and raise important questions about the ANC’s future as a dominant party. Would the ANC be able to deliver its promises and maintain its legitimacy? Would President Zuma and the ANC leadership be able to address the big issues that sickening South Africa today?

The ANC wasn’t just elected into government in 1994. It reclaimed the freedom and self-determination of all people by means of a struggle that was long, bloody, dehumanizing, humiliating and towards the ends, fairly clever. On a continent where democracy is largely just another corrupt form of failed governance, the ANC is the party that won the struggle, thereby becoming the natural leader of the nation.

But the power the ANC holds in its current form is neither saturated nor guaranteed. Its leadership is not carved in stone. The massive power struggles within the party are the truest form of political rivalry and need to be given more attention. The prevalent whining about the definition of a “true democracy“ and the size and relevance of the opposition also misses the point. The government is not accountable to its opposition. It is accountable to its people.

Many things have improved in South Africa since 1994, to be sure.  State racism has ended, and the country now boasts what many describe as the most progressive constitution in the world.  People have rights, and there are institutions designed to protect and uphold those rights. Still, everyday life for most South Africans remains a struggle – a struggle that is infinitely compounded by the sense of disappointment that accompanies it, given the gap between the expectations of liberation and the state of abjection that the majority continues to inhabit.

South Africa’s unemployment rate in 1994 was 13 percent – so bad that most were convinced it could not get worse.  Yet today it is double that, at more than 25 percent.  Add all the people who have given up searching for work, and the figure is closer to 37 percent.  The situation is particularly bad for young people.  The Economist recently reported that “half of South Africans under 24 looking for work have none. Of those who have jobs, a third earn less than $2 a day.”

Besides its dismal record on employment, South Africa also boasts a reputation for being one of the most unequal countries in the world.  Not only has aggregate income inequality worsened since the end of apartheid, income inequality between racial groups has worsened as well.

According to the 2015 census, black households earn only 16 percent of that which white households earn. About 62 percent of all black people live below the poverty line, while in the rural areas of the former homelands this figure rises to a shocking 79 percent. In 2006, 70 percent of South Africa’s land was still under the control of whites, who constitute a mere 10 percent of the population.  The ANC’s Black Economic Empowerment programme has succeeded in minting new black millionaires (South Africa has 7,800 of them now), but cannot seem to manage the much more basic goal of eliminating poverty.

How could things have gone so wrong?  Much of it has to do with what happened during the negotiated transition of the 1980s and early 1990s.  The apartheid National Party was determined to ensure that the transition would not undermine key corporate interests in South Africa, specifically finance and mining.  They were willing to bargain away political power so long as they could retain control over the economy.  And so they did.  The ANC was forced to retreat from its position on nationalisation, and an IMF deal signed just before the transition deregulated the financial sector and clamped down on wage increases.  The central bank, left in the hands of the old apartheid bosses, was insulated from democratic politics and its mandate limited to targeting inflation instead of employment or growth.

The National Party only managed to extract these concessions because they had successfully divided the resistance movement between moderate elites, such as Thabo Mbeki, who had spent many years in exile, and the more radical activists who were at the forefront of the struggle within South Africa itself.  The latter were largely unrepresented in the economic negotiations, while the former enjoyed a sort of royal treatment, including a now infamous series of secret meetings in the United Kingdom with major figures in mining and finance.

Mbeki, a self-proclaimed Thatcherite, was easy to convince.  He already believed in the basic neoliberal principles that the National Party were hoping to instantiate. For him, the route to prosperity for the new nation depended not on nationalisation and redistribution, but on “free trade” and foreign investment, which would supposedly grow the economy and trickle down to the poor.

Still, when the ANC assumed power in 1994 it implemented a progressive policy initiative known as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).  The RDP was designed to promote equitable development and poverty reduction, mostly through public investment and the mass rollout of social services to connect millions of people to housing, electricity, water, and clinics.

Despite its successes, this policy framework was abandoned a mere two years later.  Mbeki and then Finance Minister Trevor Manuel held clandestine discussions with World Bank advisors toward drafting a new economic policy known as GEAR (Growth, Employment, and Redistribution, even though it accomplished precious little of the latter). It was implemented in 1996 despite significant resistance from within the ranks of the unions that had given such force to the anti-apartheid struggle.  Known by its detractors as the “1996 class project”, GEAR amounted to a sort of neoliberal shock therapy: more privatisation, lower trade barriers, and looser financial controls.

When the ANC came to power with a landslide vote in 1994, they did so on the promises of the Freedom Charter.  Penned in 1955, the Freedom Charter expressed South Africans’ demands for the right to work, housing, freedom of movement, and – most radically – economic justice.  “The national wealth of our country, the heritage of South Africans, shall be restored to the people,” the Charter reads.  “The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the Banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole, [and] all other industry and trade shall be controlled to assist the wellbeing of the people.”

Most South Africans agree that these promises have been horribly betrayed.  South Africa’s mineral wealth, including some of the richest seams of gold, platinum, and coal in the world, remain in the hands of corporations such as British-owned Anglo American.  The finance sector, which has ballooned to a dangerously large 21 percent of the country’s GDP, remains mostly monopolised by four white-owned conglomerates.

Given these contradictions, it is no wonder that South Africa is ablaze with discontent, earning it the title of “protest capital of the world”.  It seems that every year authorities report that the number of protests has reached the highest levels since the end of apartheid.  And, indeed, the figures are staggering: Since last year some 3,000 protests occurred over a 90 day period, involving more than a million people.  South Africans are taking to the streets as they give up on electoral politics.  This is particularly true for the young: Nearly 75 percent of voters aged 20-29 did not participate in the last local elections.

The government’s response has been a mix of police repression and the continued rollout of welfare grants, which now reach more than 15 million people.  The grants are a stop-gap solution to the failure of trickle-down economics, a way of papering over the contradictions of South African capitalism; everyone is aware that without them poverty and inequality would be so unbearable that the country’s already tenuous sense of social stability would come crashing to an end.

So far the protests have been focused on issues like access to housing, water, electricity, and other basic services, but it won’t be long before they coalesce into something much more powerful, as they did during the last decade of apartheid.  There are already signs that this is beginning to happen.  The Economic Freedom Fighters, recently founded by Julius Malema, the unsavoury former leader of the ANC Youth League, is successfully mobilising discontented youth and making a strong push to nationalise the mines and the banks.  On a more interesting front, NUMSA, the metal workers union, recently broke ranks with the ANC in an historic turn that could open the way for a labour-based opposition to the ruling party for the first time since 1994.

It seems that the ANC’s legitimacy is beginning to unravel and consent among the governed has begun to thin.  It is clear that since the death of Mandela in 2013, ANC, in its current form of leadership, has dramatically failed to reconnect with its voters and lost its soul: liberation of the struggle.

In short, the situation in South Africa over the past 20 years opens up interesting questions about the meaning of democracy.  What is democracy if it doesn’t allow people to determine their own economic destiny or benefit from the vast wealth of the commons?  What is freedom if it serves only the capital interests of the country’s elite?  The revolution that brought the end of apartheid has accomplished a great deal, to be sure, but it has not yet reached its goal.  Liberation is not yet at hand.

By  Prof Guylain Gustave Moke
International Affairs Expert
Political Analyst/Author

Photo Credit: AFP-Getty Image photo of ANC Leader, Jacob Zuma